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The Scholars’ Initiative addresses the 
need to break the cycle of nationalist 
discourse that perpetuates divisions 
between ethnic groups by (1) creating a 
common narrative that discredits 
proprietary myths, while validating 
“inconvenient facts” that must be 
acknowledged before mutual recognition 
and reconciliation can begin, and 
(2) enlisting regional media and political 
leaders to acknowledge (and hopefully) 
endorse) the existence of a common 








Two decades have now passed since the peoples of 
central and Eastern Europe emerged from a half-century of 
Communism.  Like so many other countries around the 
globe that have thrown off authoritarian regimes, they were 
inspired by the prospect of moving straight from dictatorship 
to democracy.  These sanguine expectations were certainly 
shared by many in the West.  The fall of the Soviet Union 
had been attended by great optimism that, after a century of 
totalitarianism, war and genocide, the world would finally be 
safe for democracy.  Pundits like Dennis Fukuyama even 
predicted that the post-Cold War generation had reached 
the “end of history” insofar as the future would no longer 
record the contentious competition between authoritarianism 
and pluralism; instead, “history” would presumably consist of 
little more than the unremarkable pursuit of knowledge, 
wealth, and human happiness.  
 
Instead, the “democratization” process was quickly 
overshadowed by the acrimonious, and sometimes violent 
dissolution of multiethnic societies throughout the formerly 
Communist eastern half of Europe.  Although the bloody 
demise of Yugoslavia grabbed most of the headlines, the 
independence of most other eastern bloc countries was 
attended by tensions and bloody secession movements 
across the Caucasus (i.e. Abkhazia, Chechnya, Nagorno-
Karabakh, South Ossetia). Moreover, the same process has 
played out elsewhere.  Democratization in the Muslim World 
– whether in Afghanistan and Iraq following U.S. 
intervention, in post-Suharto Indonesia (i.e. Aceh, the 
Moluccas, East Timor) or among the successor states of the 
Arab Spring – has exposed deep rifts in multiethnic societies 
that had appeared to non-experts as culturally monolithic.  
Nor can we ignore the potential for ethnic conflict in 
countries like Myanmar as they move toward pluralism.  
Indeed, Western impatience with China’s ruling elite fails to 
account for that country’s complex mosaic of cultural and 
language groups that would quickly seek empowerment in 
the aftermath of free elections. 
 
A central feature in ethnic conflict is the parallel 
existence of separate, competing national narratives that pit 
the peoples of defunct empires against one another.  This is 
certainly the case across central Europe, where newly 
created nation-states have crafted mutually exclusive, 
proprietary  historical   accounts  that   justify  their  separate  
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existence.  Inevitably, each narrative employs a 
different array of “truths”, many of which are either 
distorted or blatantly untrue, while carefully 
excising “inconvenient facts” that promote the utility 
of multiethnic coexistence and justify the dissonant 
narrative or political agenda of other national 
groups.  The resulting, divergent recitations of 
history not only unite each new repu.0blic’s 
constituent “state-forming” nationality, but also sow 
mistrust, resentment and even hatred between 
them and other peoples with whom they had 
previously coexisted.  In the former Yugoslavia 
mutually exclusive national narratives have divided 
the previously dominant Serbs against their former 
wartime adversaries in Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia 
and Kosovo. 
 
Far from resolving these divisions, the 
democratization process has accelerated and 
intensified conflicts.  It is virtually impossible for 
politicians to confront and expose national myths 
and inconvenient truths in an age of mass politics, 
particularly in democratic societies where the 
voting public has already internalized what it has 
learned from previous generations, whether in 
schoolbooks or across the kitchen table.  
Notwithstanding the many positive attributes of 
democracy and the almost universal faith that it 
inspires as an instrument of societal justice and 
stability, the greater accountability of popularly 
elected leaders mortgages their ability to confront 
and reconcile competing narratives that are firmly 
entrenched in popular memory.   
 
The international community has employed a 
number of strategies for bridging the cognitive gap 
between peoples.  Western media platforms such 
as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and the 
BBC have disseminated news and information, 
while philanthropic NGOs like the Soros 
Foundation’s Open Society Institute have 
sponsored numerous confidence-building, “people-
to-people” programs.  International tribunals have 
painstakingly investigated, and then exposed 
criminal acts committed by all sides in conflict 
zones from Rwanda and West Africa to the former 
Yugoslavia.  Yet none of these vehicles has been 
able to overcome the proprietary representations of 
“patriotic” political leaders --- and the great majority 
of “mainstream” media platforms that articulate the 
prevailing national narrative. This is especially 
evident today in Serbia, whose newly democratic 
leaders and free media continue to ignore or deny 
the criminal record of the Milošević regime; the 
recent election of the neo-fascist Tomislav Nikolić 
attests to the grip of myth and denial over the 
Serbian people, the great majority of whom still 
adore mass murderers currently being tried for 
genocide at The Hague.  Moreover, so long as 
they retain a de facto monopoly over public 
memory, perception, and interpretation, nationalist 
politicians there and elsewhere will continue to 
discredit and marginalize the few independent 
voices that challenge them.  Indeed, there exist 
many among the region’s political, academic and 
media elite who privately concede the corruption of 
their vocal majority’s historical accounts, but who 





Over the past decade, an international 
consortium of 300+ historians and social scientists 
from 29 countries have researched, written and 
published a common history of the Yugoslav 
conflicts of the 1990s.  In January 2009, Purdue 
University Press and the U.S. Institute of Peace 
jointly published Confronting the Yugoslav 
Controversies: a Scholars’ Initiative, which 
challenged the tendentious nationalistic narratives 
that have succeeded so well in dividing the 
peoples of central Europe, both exposing and 
discrediting each belligerent’s myths about the 
Yugoslav conflicts, while simultaneously inserting 
indisputable, but inconvenient facts known to their 
former adversaries.  One year later a Serbo-
Croatian edition appeared in Sarajevo.  Its work is 
embodied in the research of twelve multinational 
research teams each of which was charged with 
focusing on the most contentious issues that 
impede mutual understanding between the Serbs 
and their wartime adversaries across the newly 
constructed territorial and cultural frontiers of 
former Yugoslavia.   
 
From the beginning, the Scholars’ Initiative (SI) 
committed itself to three core principles that guided 
all its activities:  (1) an absolute insistence on 
scholarly integrity and methodologies, (2) the 
inclusivity of both sources and participants from all 
“sides” in the Yugoslav conflicts, and (3) the 
adoption of full transparency of the programmatic 
use of electronic mail for transmission and for 
review of every draft of the twelve team reports to 
all project participants. 
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Whereas the presentation of a common 
narrative was itself revolutionary, the SI also broke 
new ground by engaging with the public in each of 
the Yugoslav successor states. From the outset, its 
leadership worked closely both with regional 
television, radio and print media in presenting its 
findings and with civic and political leaders 
(principally incumbent presidents, prime ministers 
and foreign ministers), who were apprised of the 
project’s progress and of the hope that they would 
place a foot on the common platform that their own 
scholars had helped build.  Over the past three 
years, political leaders in Bosnia, Croatia and 
Kosovo (though not yet Serbia) have responded to 
numerous news broadcasts throughout the region 
by issuing public endorsements of the project and 
its findings.  Recognizing the SI’s utility for 
achieving a systemic solution to the region’s ethnic 
divisions, the U.S. State Department also actively 
supported the project by lobbying political leaders 
on its behalf.  Indeed, in the three years since the 
publication of the initial English-language edition, 
the SI has achieved each of six objectives that it 
identified at the project’s outset to: 
 
1) forge lasting professional ties and dialogue 
among scholars across the former Yugoslavia, 
western Europe and North America 
2) provide the first platform for assembling and 
analyzing primary and secondary sources from 
all sides of the Yugoslav conflicts in a single, 
balanced and readily accessible account 
3) publish new, original research that exposes 
(some of) the myths and resolves (some of) 
those controversies that have foreclosed 
meaningful transnational communication 
between scholars and mutual understanding 
among peoples of the former Yugoslavia 
4) impact the public consciousness of the ethnic 
and national groups of former Yugoslavia 
through public media 
5) encourage political (and other opinion) leaders 
to adopt positions in public discourse that share 
or create common ground across the region’s 
ethnic and national divides 
6) create a model for transnational dialogue 
among scholars elsewhere in central Europe. 
 
In November the SI will publish a second edition 
that will incorporate new evidence that has been 
uncovered since 2009; a second Serbo-Croatian 




Given that the forces of Balkan nationalism 
have been evolving for nearly two centuries, it 
would be absurdly premature to proclaim any 
lasting measure of success.  Nonetheless, the SI’s 
achievement in presenting a common narrative 
offers a model for challenging the hegemony of 
nationalist discourse in the newly emerging 
democratic societies. Indeed, over the past year 
(August 2011, July 2012), members of the British 
Parliament’s All Party Parliamentary Group 
(APPG) for Cyprus have hosted presentations by 
SI Project Director Charles Ingrao and British 
academic experts as it searches for a solution to 
the 38-year deadlock in negotiations between the 
former British colony’s Greek and Turkish 
communities.  The SI is already widely known to 
policy makers at the U.S. State Department and to 
Congressional staffers, particularly on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.  But this is just a 
start to correcting an endemic problem that has 
drained much of the Western world’s humanity 
over the past century.  
 
Given the central role that hegemonic 
narratives play in mobilizing and entrenching 
nationalist forces in democratic societies, it is naive 
to assume that frozen conflicts like Yugoslavia, 
Cyprus, and Israel-Palestine can be resolved 
anytime in the foreseeable future without 
confronting their competing national narratives.  
The same grim logic applies to the prospects for 
easing international tensions between countries 
that have been divided for generations by 
incompatible renditions of the past.  After all, nearly 
a century has passed since the commission of the 
Armenian Genocide without any acknowledgment 
by generations of elected Turkish politicians; seven 
decades after the rape of Nanjing and untold 
“comfort women”, successive Japanese 
parliaments cannot acknowledge Chinese and 
Korean narratives of their victimhood at the hands 
of the Japanese Imperial Army; six decades after 
the creation of Israel, its current government 
continues to block efforts by Israeli and Palestinian 
scholars to acknowledge common ground about 
the events of 1948; nor will democratically elected 
Indian and Pakistani governments ever be able to 
reconcile their mutually exclusive renditions of the 
sub-continent’s violent dissolution just one year 
earlier.  
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Our continued failure to diagnose the cultural 
malaise behind these frozen conflicts will 
perpetuate the tensions that always complicate 
and frequently paralyze international cooperation 
on even the most mundane issues. That we have 
been working around these problems for over a 
half-century should not condemn us to 
perpetuating them when a systemic solution is 
within our reach.  If we can derive solace from our 
dysfunctionalism, it is that public education and 
literacy in much of Asia and most of Africa have yet 
to reach a stage where citizens can be mobilized 
on a comparable scale.  With an estimated eighty 
percent of the world’s land borders cutting across 
ethnic groups, there may be many more 
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